High-pressure (<20MPa) gas cylinders are currently the most ubiquitous method of hydrogen storage, with austenitic stainless steels – a form of stainless steel containing significant amounts of chromium and nickel – and aluminium alloys being the most popular to date, due to their very high tensile strengths and relatively low densities, as well as their high immunity to hydrogen effects (reaction and diffusion) at ambient temperatures. Lightweight fibre-reinforced composite structures have also been developed which, while not isotropic (equal in every direction) in strength, can be designed to withstand pressures up to 80MPa, for a significant volumetric density – a key factor in mobile hydrogen storage. However, a critical issue with high-pressure gas storage is the opposition of volumetric and gravimetric density, whereby increasing the pressure increases the former but decreases the latter, and vice-versa. While gas cylinders have been sufficient to date, new designs are needed for hydrogen aircraft.

One such highly promising alternative to gas-state hydrogen storage is liquid-state storage in cryogenic tanks (21.2K/-251.8°C) at ambient pressure. This would present a multitude of benefits, including improved safety as a result of reduced operating pressures and improved tank design flexibility as pressurized tanks can generally only be built in cylindrical geometries. There is however one fundamental issue with cryogenic liquid storage: cost. The Joule-Thompson/Linde cycle, the simplest hydrogen liquefaction method, is still complicated and thus expensive. Additionally, storage at cryogenic temperatures is complex, and boil-off losses can result from heat leaks. In optimal conditions (a double-walled, vacuum-insulated spherical dewar), a 100m³ tank would typically experience a 0.2% daily loss, although this will increase for non-optimal tank designs (e.g. non-spherical tanks) likely necessary for aircraft.

While less developed, storage by absorption is also possible. There are several propositions, including physisorption (attraction) of hydrogen molecules onto the surface of a solid. Large specific surface area (i.e. surface area-to-weight) materials, such as nanostructured or activated carbon, and carbon nanotubes (CNTs), are possible substrates. CNTs are of particular interest as the tube cavity, which has a width of less than a few molecular diameters, causing field overlap and increased attractive force between the carbon and the hydrogen. By comparison, the planar graphene sheets in graphite have less attraction but are easier to manufacture.

Physisorption for hydrogen storage has potential due to low operating pressure and material cost, as well as simple design architecture, but the small volumetric and gravimetric densities are significant drawbacks. Another method of solid hydrogen storage is the reaction with transition metals at elevated temperatures to form hydrides. Hydrogen reacts with many of the more electropositive elements (i.e. Sc, Ti, Va) and sits in the metallic crystal structure, without pressure changes in the system. This can result in extremely high volumetric hydrogen density, making metal hydrides a very effective method by which to safely and compactly store large amounts of hydrogen. The current achievable gravimetric density of about 3 mass% is however a limiting factor for aircraft, meaning the challenge to design a lightweight metal hydride system still remains.

A different system of complex hydrides can also be used: lightweight metals from groups 1, 2, and 3 (e.g. Li, Mg, B, Al, etc.), to give rise to a large variety of metal-hydrogen complexes. The primary difference between these and metallic hydrides is the transition to an ionic or covalent compound upon the absorption of hydrogen. These are very stable and decompose only at temperatures above the melting point of the complex. However, very high gravimetric densities at room temperature are possible: iBH4 has 18 mass% hydrogen – ideal for aircraft. Overall, materials science is a key piece in the hydrogen aircraft puzzle. New materials for absorbed hydrogen storage will be important in the transformation of hydrogen-propelled travel from prototypes to a scaled market solution in sustainable air travel.

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Boeing, in particular, has been leading in the development of BWB unmanned aerial aircraft (UAVs) with the X-45 (2002) and X-48 (B-2007, C-2013), as well as earlier prototypes by McDonnell Douglas, which was acquired by Boeing in 1997. In the early 2000s, their plan was to develop a flying wing – similar to a blended wing but with no defined fuselage at all, meaning it is the body itself, which generates the lift–passenger aircraft, colloquially labelled the “797”. It would have had room for at least 1,000 seats due to the significant payload improvements which are possible with a BWB design and would likely have been a modern successor to the 747 and competitor to the new Airbus A380 but with a greater than 10% fuel efficiency improvement compared with either. However, the “797” never even reached the prototype stage, likely due to technical and logistical (the aircraft would be significantly heavier and wider than current large airliners, necessitating infrastructure redesign) complexities. The concept was not popular in consultations, where the theatre-style seating configuration and reduced emergency exits were unpopular. Boeing did however continue to explore the BWB concept for military applications, such as strategic airlifting and aerial refueling. Airbus has also recently explored similar options for BWB passenger aircraft, which they say would reduce fuel consumption by up to 20%. An experimental UAV demonstrator, the MAVERIC, first flew in June 2019. With a wingspan of just 3.2 metres, the MAVERIC was only a scaled-down model of the theoretical production aircraft, a 200-passenger hydrogen turbofan aircraft announced in 2020, which would form part of Airbus’ ZEROe range of emission-free aircraft.

Despite these forays into BWB passenger aircraft, the largest use of flying wing designs especially has been in the military bomber and reconnaissance sectors. Northrop Grumman is a particularly important player in this sector as the manufacturer of the B-2 Spirit (1987) bomber, the first production aircraft to use a flying wing design, aiding its aerodynamic efficiency, payload, and, most importantly, its observability. Based on previous discontinued Northrop projects – the YB-35 and YB-49 – from the early 1950s, the B-2 was truly revolutionary in the field of strategic stealth bombing, and all but one (destroyed in a 2008 crash) are still in service today, due to be replaced in 2032 with the new B-21 Raider. Also designed by Northrop Grumman for the US Air Force (USAF) as part of the Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) program, it will serve a similar purpose to the B-2, with the capability to deliver both conventional and thermonuclear weapons. The B-21 will also replace the nearly 50-year-old B-1 Lancer and will be the first of the new Sixth-Generation Aircraft family. It will introduce a range of new designs, materials, and weapons technologies to a flying wing design very similar to that of the B-2.

To conclude, the concept of a BWB aircraft has been around for a century but has so far only had limited use, with its primary application being high-altitude, long-range military reconnaissance and bomber aircraft such as the SR-71 Blackbird, B-1 Lancer, and B-2 Spirit. This will also remain a future use case of flying wing designs, with the soon-to-be-delivered sixth-generation B-21 Raider being just one example. However, BWB aircraft also possess significant potential in other areas, namely the civil aviation and strategic military airlifting and refuelling segments, with both Airbus and Boeing showing significant interest as the two largest filers of patents in this area over the last decade. It is therefore likely that blended and flying wings will play some role in the future of both civil and military aviation.

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A hydrogen fuel cell works by an electrochemical reaction between hydrogen and oxygen. The hydrogen is oxidised to a single proton as it passes over a platinum anode, while the oxygen is reduced as it passes over a platinum cathode. The protons pass through an electrolyte membrane and react with the oxygen at the cathode, producing only water and energy. This makes it environmentally friendly, as the water can be recycled into the natural water system. Despite hydrogen seems to be the solution to green aviation, it also posits challenges for infrastructure and safety. As hydrogen is a minuscule molecule, leaking is common. This is not only a major efficiency concern but could become unsafe as hydrogen is highly flammable. Recently, Nasa’s launch of Artemis 1 was delayed due to a liquid hydrogen leak. Although as a comparison to Jet A fuel, it is less flammable with a flammability concentration limit of 4% versus Jet A’s 0.7%. However, Jet A is significantly less volatile and has a lower minimum ignition energy of between five millijoules and one joule, whereas Hydrogen’s is 0.02 millijoules. This could cause problems certifying hydrogen aircraft, as the widely accepted guideline is ten times higher at 0.2 millijoules. Hydrogen diffuses quickly and has a higher auto-ignition temperature, so this may not become an issue.

Despite hydrogen having around three times more energy per kilogram than conventional jet fuel, Hydrogen only has 0.0028kWh per litre and jet fuel has 9.52, as jet fuel is a liquid under atmospheric conditions. In order to produce the same energy as one litre of jet fuel, you would need 3,200 litres of hydrogen at the same pressure. This makes jet fuel much more efficient. Under standard conditions, and with its tanks full of hydrogen, a Boeing 787-9 would only have enough energy to fly for 21 seconds. This is why developing more efficient methods of storing liquid hydrogen will be vital for its viability as aviation fuel. Even as a liquid, hydrogen will need four times the volume to deliver the same power as jet fuel. Hydrogen is stored in big spherical tanks, so it doesn’t boil off. It has a boiling point of 20 kelvin (-252.9°C). This is a huge barrier due to the challenges of storing large quantities cheaply. There are also issues in storing hydrogen on the aircraft. Normally, jet fuel is loaded into the wings of passenger aircraft. Hydrogen won’t be able to do that effectively due to the size and shape of the tanks required, so would need to fit in the fuselage, decreasing the payload and passenger volumes by up to 40% on conventional designs. Although blended wing bodies may be able to overcome this issue, they are yet to be built and won’t fit in current airports.

Hydrogen aircraft are only green if the hydrogen is being produced cleanly. While hydrogen is the most abundant element on Earth, it is locked up in other molecules. Steam Methane Reforming (SMR) produces 99.9% of the world’s hydrogen annually (19 million tons) and for every one kilogram of hydrogen it produces, nine kilograms of carbon dioxide are produced – this is a challenging overhead for environmentally sustainable goals. Green hydrogen can be produced by electrolysis, but only makes up less than 0.04% of all hydrogen produced globally. It is much more expensive at $5.10 -$23.27 per kilogram for solar electrolysis, whereas SMR-produced hydrogen costs less than $1 per kilogram.

Despite the many challenges, large corporations have decided to launch projects. Airbus’ ZEROe project has three hybrid-hydrogen designs for a turbofan, turboprop and blended wing body aircraft and Boeing has conducted six hydrogen technology demonstrations. Some startups are attempting innovations too. ZeroAvia’s mission is ‘a hydrogen-electric engine in every aircraft.’ The challenges of hydrogen-powered aircraft providing the answer to environmentally sustainable aviation are only beginning to be answered, but much more investment will be needed to develop this technology for it to be the cheapest and most practical option.

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Recent estimates indicate that Russian forces are firing in excess of 20,000 artillery shells per day, with the Ukrainian armed forces firing around one-third of that at 6,000-7,000 per day in late February 2023. For Ukraine’s military allies in the West, the continued provision of munitions and other military aid to offset Ukraine’s material disadvantage has only highlighted the glaring flaws in their own defence industrial complexes. Smaller nations are having to increase defence budgets to restore pre-war stockpiles, while even the US defence industry is having to re-assess its capacity to sustain wartime levels of production across an expansive range of weapons systems and platforms.

Historical divergence in procurement priorities and defence spending has produced different challenges and limitations for the various nations currently involved in this conflict, with Russian forces facing a recurring lack of precision-guided munitions (PGM) throughout the conflict while Ukraine’s post-war defence industry has had extreme difficulty sustaining nearly all of the Ukrainian military’s material needs once Cold-War stockpiles were expended.

For the Russians, this issue stemmed from the lack of investment in both domestic infrastructure and industrial expertise, with Russian firms relying heavily on foreign suppliers in the West and beyond to acquire critical subcomponents such as semiconductors, INS/GNSS navigation modules and other microelectronics. Mimicking US strategy during the Gulf Wars, Russian forces expended a significant portion of their PGM stockpiles in attempted ‘decapitation’ strikes in February 2022, but once the main offensive had stalled and Western nations began implementing trade sanctions, the domestic defence industry was rendered almost entirely incapable of producing PGMs, let alone sustaining high wartime production rates. Attempts to offset this issue by re-purposing other weapons systems (i.e. employing anti-ship missiles for ground-attack roles) and by relying on significant Cold-War stockpiles of conventional munitions have also proven inadequate, as the lack of consistent maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) compounded by rampant corruption has rendered large proportions of those munitions unsafe or unfit for purpose.

Russian failures in Ukraine highlight the significant strategic and financial risks incurred by nations who fail to develop industry expertise and capacity, with the Russian Government now forced to source munitions and all other manners of defence equipment from allied states such as Iran, North Korea and possibly even China.

In Europe, many nations have consistently invested in domestic technical expertise over the past several decades while the lack of consistent procurement compared to the US or Russia has incentivised greater bi-lateral collaboration as European firms are forced to pool their manufacturing resources to meet large orders, which are often few and far between.

This approach has produced its own challenges, as though European defence firms have the requisite expertise to produce munitions and material domestically, they face greater difficulty in producing equipment at scale, with the slower tempo of European defence procurement having severely undermined the industry’s ability to ramp-up production to meet wartime needs. Though several major European governments, including France, Germany, Poland, Sweden and the UK have recognised this pitfall and are now financing the expansion of their defence manufacturing capabilities, certain European nations have already opted to source large quantities of materiel from abroad, with orders for US and South Korean defence products in Europe rising dramatically over the past year.

This issue of capacity is further exacerbated by several unique regulatory pitfalls in Europe, which effectively negate the inherent benefits of European industrial rapprochement, most notably restrictions on exports and re-exports of defence products. For example, a large number of European states were unable to donate munitions and equipment from their own stockpiles due to strict re-exportation licences, primarily on products sourced from the German and Swiss defence industries. In Switzerland, the SWISS ASD federation of defence firms has raised concerns that enforcement of these licenses has undermined the reliability of Swiss defence products and resulted in the cancellation of anticipated orders.

Meanwhile, regulatory disagreements regarding the export of defence equipment were one of several factors informing the Polish Government’s decision to source material from South Korean firm Hanwha Defense instead of expanding on its existing relationship with German firm Rheinmetall. It could be argued that overregulation within the European defence industry is undermining its long-term economic viability, which, if left unaddressed, could result in market monopolisation and overreliance on foreign allies like the US as the ultimate guarantor of European security. Though European states do retain equipment and munitions stockpiles, which are subject to sustainment activities which ensure their long-term reliability, the Ukrainian military’s wartime attrition rates have only highlighted how small these stockpiles are in comparison with Russian reserves, further reinforcing the need for sustainable production capacity in the European defence sphere.

As for the nation with the largest and most reliably funded defence industry, which has maintained significant manufacturing capacity and technical expertise through exorbitant levels of investment, the US is still having to address supply chain issues which could hamper its ability to sustain its forces in a high-intensity conflict with a peer-level adversary. Unlike Europe, the US invests in the acquisition of extremely large equipment stockpiles to ensure sustainment of offensive capabilities, and unlike Russia has expended large sums on MRO for stockpiled equipment to guarantee reliability over the long term. As the largest exporter of defence equipment, the US defence industry has benefitted from a consistent revenue stream from both domestic and foreign clientele, allowing it to continue modernising infrastructure and growing expertise despite US military forces having been engaged in several conflicts since 2001. However, the issue with the US defence industry is that the majority of R&D and manufacturing capabilities had been tailored to supply equipment for low-intensity warfare and counterinsurgency operations throughout the Global War on Terror.

Analysts had long predicted this singular focus undermined innovation in high-intensity warfare-related capabilities, with successive US administrations having attempted a strategic geopolitical pivot to the Asia-Pacific and the growing threat of a peer-level conflict erupting in that region. Consequently, the re-adaptation of US defence manufacturing capabilities has faced several hurdles, with firms such as Lockheed Martin and Raytheon Technologies facing delays in restarting production of legacy munitions and systems such as the Stinger AA and Javelin ATGM missiles due to their supply chains having been inoperative for nearly three decades.

Nevertheless, US firms have remained confident in their ability to rapidly scale up production to meet the Pentagon’s demands due to their significant technical expertise, with Raytheon arguing that production will return to optimal levels once they have redesigned components which are no longer commercially available. Consequently, despite the undeniable need for additional investment to affect this macro-strategic refocus on a high-intensity warfare portfolio and capacity, the US defence industry has proven to be the most adaptive and resilient in the face of evolving global geopolitics and is set to reap the benefits of this industrial flexibility over the coming decade.

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The good, the bad, and the ugly

The space economy’s recent fortunes have been mixed. The James Webb Telescope continues to offer unparalleled insights into both our solar system and our wider universe, while low earth orbit (LEO) satellite operators continue to reach new deals with commercial partners. For example, SpaceX’s partnership with T-Mobile represents a key milestone for mainstreaming its Starlink offering.

However, it is safe to say that other aspects of the space industry have experienced setbacks. Hype has given way to disappointment, with NASA’s Artemis I receiving its fair share of problems, with the launch being delayed for a third time earlier this week. The rocket’s nefarious hydrogen fuel leak has created several false starts, but now the Space Launch System (SLS) vehicle is being hampered by weather difficulties, with tropical storms threatening its launch window.

Meanwhile, Blue Origin’s fiery launch failure led to the destruction of one of its uncrewed New Shepard rockets and will have disquieted prospective space tourists. While the abort mechanism worked, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) grounded the rocket as an investigation takes place.

The space economy remains on track

While these trials and tribulations will undermine business confidence surrounding space exploration in the short term, GlobalData’s Tech in 2030 report predicts that the market will remain on track for a space infrastructure boom by 2030. Putting Blue Origin’s pyrotechnic display aside, recent failures have marked key tests of space capability in areas where teething problems are to be expected. However, taking a longer-term view, space infrastructure is set to experience a significant uptick in investment between now and 2030.

The space economy will see a wave of private and public investment as companies seek a first mover advantage in their respective sectors. Countries will also continue to compete for geopolitical dominance in a bid to extend their national interests beyond the bounds of Earth. Public and private companies, as well as nation states, have issued ambitious infrastructure targets, ranging from space business parks to orbital outposts in the lead up to 2030. For example, in late 2022, China will finish the construction of its Tiangong space station, while Russia has declared its plans to withdraw from the ISS in 2024 and create its own orbital outpost. Also in 2024, Axiom Space will launch the first of its four commercial modules, which will eventually become its own space station, while Blue Origin and Sierra Space aim to launch their commercial space station, Orbital Reef, by 2030.

While a lot of these targets verge on the aspirational, they signal an important shift. Competition will drive increased investment in space infrastructure, with a proliferation in the number of commercial and national space stations to be expected. Despite the drama, infrastructure that allows a more sustained human presence in space is becoming a mainstay of space companies’ long-term strategies. As a result, GlobalData predicts that by 2030, the first tailored piece of space infrastructure will be constructed for civilian astronauts.

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It is important that observers not conclude that as SpaceX’s satellites avoided collisions, the threat from ASAT-related space debris is not considerable. SpaceX’s satellites are among some of the best equipped and most prepared to manage such threats, being empowered by an autonomous collision avoidance manoeuvre system. This system, long touted by SpaceX, allows StarLink satellites to automatically detect and avoid incoming threats. However, the satellites of other companies are not as prepared and lack such systems and so would be forced to manually navigate through these squalls. This would be a technically challenging undertaking. It is possible that, in the absence of ASAT-testing regulation, systems such as SpaceX’s will be an essential component of constellations going forward – the norm rather than the exception. Such a change in the industry would drive the costs of mass constellations up, potentially impacting smaller competitors to companies such as SpaceX and Amazon and limiting the ability of new firms to enter the market. It must also be noted that the impact of ASAT-related space debris being experienced currently is merely those derived from relatively limited testing exercises. In the event that ASAT weapons are used, they will likely be deployed on a much larger scale, meaning that the levels of space debris being experienced would be on a qualitatively higher level. It remains to be seen whether the space environment collectively could survive such an event as one which can feasibly be accessed and exploited, even with enhancements such as artificial intelligence (AI)-empowered collision avoidance software.

Given the risks derived from ASAT-related space debris, an examination of international space law is required. Currently, international conduct in space is governed by Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. The treaty is directed at establishing provisions which will allow and enforce peaceful conduct in space. However, it could be argued that current provisions which address damage to outer space platforms presuppose peaceful conduct and neglect to prohibit aggressive action against satellites. Article VII establishes that states are liable for the damage caused by objects launched from their territory or facilities. In a hypothetical context where such weapons will be used, such provisions are very unlikely to sway states against using ASAT capabilities. In order to eliminate the chance of this scenario emerging in the future, it is instead necessary to build an international consensus that platforms which target orbital platforms should be prohibited.

Additionally, it could be argued that there is some ambiguity in the treaty. For example, Article IV attempts to prevent the weaponisation of space, preventing the installation of orbital weapons through the language “States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.” However, what constitutes a ‘weapon of mass destruction’ is not established. Furthermore, it could be argued that at the time of writing (1967), the importance of space-based systems to both national security and the global economy could not be foreseen. As such, the treaty reflects the Cold War spirit at the time of writing in that it primarily is targeted at preventing orbital stations from being used as launch platforms for WMDs. It neglects to a certain extent to govern aggressive actions between orbital platforms or ground-based attacks against such platforms. Given the scorched earth effect a large-scale ASAT attack would have on the orbital environment, this omission is increasingly glaring and requires addressing.

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For partner nations open to extending the life of the ISS, a Russian exit causes an issue primarily in replacing the Soyuz rocket which has been instrumental in both constructing and supplying the station, as well as keeping the station in orbit with regular boosts. Since the 2003 Space Shuttle Columbia disaster, and the Space Shuttle’s subsequent retirement in 2011, Soyuz has been critical to the success of the ISS. The rocket has performed around 60% of crewed and un-crewed missions to man and resupply the station. For a decade, there have been few Western alternatives that can match Soyuz in terms of reliability and value-for-money. However, the war in Ukraine has arrived at a moment in the development of the Western space industry where several platforms and companies are reaching maturity. For example, Nasa has begun testing the Northrop Grumman’s Cygnus spacecraft for use in periodic reboots to keep the station in orbit. Additionally, in 2020 SpaceX successfully launched Nasa astronauts to the ISS in its Crew Dragon craft. Whilst the West has previously relied on Russian involvement in the ISS program, this is no longer the case. Therefore, the greatest threat to the ISS, and the space environment in general, posed by the war in Ukraine is a degradation of the cooperative spirit which had previously existed.

The space environment is becoming increasingly insular, with a growing group of individual nations pursuing separate programs independently. The future of the Russian space industry is quite bleak, given the intensity of sanctions imposed following the invasion of Ukraine. Indeed, Russia is already suffering from a shortage of vital technological components. Currently, Roscosmos is planning to replace the ISS with a national station called the Russian Orbital Service Station (ROSS), which will be placed in a 400km sun-synchronous orbit allowing for high-frequency observations of Russia and easier access to the station. The core module of ROSS, (Science Power Module-1), was scheduled to be launched in 2024 as Russian left the ISS. Following a redesign delay, Science Power Module-1 is now scheduled for launch in 2025. However, Ukraine-related sanctions will make R&amp;D difficult, and this schedule could slip even further. Additionally, there is limited scope for international cooperation to support the Russian space industry. There is no longer an operational need in the West for Russian rockets, with viable Western platforms. This, combined with a prevailing anti-Kremlin political spirit, renders the West a closed market to the Russian space industry. However, even countries which have been less damning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, such as China and India, are not definite opportunities for the Russian space industry. Both are developing national space programs, with China rapidly developing a capable domestic industrial base. Whilst Russia may be able to procure parts and technology from these countries, collaborative programs are unlikely.

Conversely, the outlook for the Western space industry is brighter. Commercial space firms are growing in capabilities, with privately developed stations a real possibility. It is expected that commercial space companies will be able to develop, construct, and operate space stations from end-to-end. In December 2021, Nasa signed an agreement with Northrop Grumman, Nanoracks, and Blue Origin to design space stations which would combine scientific and commercial activities. The war in Ukraine has negatively affected the global space industry in general, largely due to the war’s broader economic impact. It is expected that the growth of the industry will slow for 1-2 years, before accelerating again. In general, the war in Ukraine has highlighted the general trend away from international cooperation in space, towards national programs. As space capabilities grow, more states are seeking to capitalize on the economic, scientific and defense potential of space. As this trend accelerates, and the space environment becomes increasingly populated, the risk of incidents between platforms grows. In the absence of cooperative programs such as the ISS, the imposition of supranational regulations on space activities is becoming ever more acute.

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As well as loitering munitions, Israel has a significant vested interest in another type of unmanned aircraft: unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). GlobalData reported that in 2021, Israel attained a 9% share of the global market in UCAV production. The global military UCAV market was valued by GlobalData at $8bn in 2021 and will grow at a CAGR of 8.26% to reach a value of $17.7bn by 2031.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a considerable success story

A critical war where UCAVs and loitering munitions were both defining features was the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020, between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

TB2s (UCAVs) and Harops (loitering munitions) – which Azerbaijan had acquired from Turkey and Israel – were hailed as key assets to its Azeri forces. Using the Harop system, they were able to conduct strike missions against Armenian anti-air systems. This then allowed UCAVs to conduct strike missions against artillery and armoured vehicles without the threat of being shot down.

New model features

IAI declares that its new model of loitering munition is ‘designed to counter the newer types of air defence radar threats’. This is increasingly important due to the move in defence towards a phenomenon called the Internet of Military Things (IoMT). This describes the use of connected sensors, radars and actuators to control and monitor the environment, the things that move within it and the people that act within it. All these sensors are used in conjunction to acquire full situational awareness and control over diverse conflict zones and battle areas.

In a press release, the IAI announced that the new features on the Harpy NG will counter newer types of air defence radar threats by covering a wider frequency band. It also uses the airframe of the Harop, which is more advanced. This is claimed to ‘enable better flying characteristics’, which include a longer loiter time, extended range, higher altitude, as well as commonality in maintenance and training.

Although some countries are wary, the tech has potential

Collin Koh, a research fellow at Singapore’s Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies told Reuters that ‘Although no major drone deals were announced at the show [Singapore Airshow 2022], as countries recover slowly from the economic woes brought by Covid-19, some of their military spending will surely go toward unmanned systems’ and that ‘there is certainly growing interest’.

Some countries may be initially deterred from purchasing this weaponry, as it can look provocative to their neighbours. However, the past success of similar models, together with these new features, gives this new model potential to thrive.

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Tristan Sauer, land domain analyst at GlobalData, notes: “Although the concept of MUM-T has been employed with varying levels of success over the last two decades, the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning capabilities would significantly enhance the viability and effectiveness of all joint formations in future operations. The US Department of Defense lists five levels of interoperability (LoI) which determine the amount of control and coordination a ‘manned’ operator exerts over unmanned platforms. These range from indirect reception of payload data (Level 1) to full control of the unmanned aircraft system (UAS) or unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) throughout the operation (Level 5). The current limitations of the MUM-T concept revolve around the LoI scale, as higher levels of control are typically associated with several detrimental factors, including sensory overload, task saturation and reduced situational awareness. However, Elbit has demonstrated that advances in AI technology will allow for enhanced autonomy and redundancy amongst future military unmanned platforms, thus drastically reducing both the logistical and cognitive burdens of MUM-T in future operations.”

“During a recent demonstration, Elbit Systems illustrated how robotic autonomous systems (RAS) technology would enable UAS and UGV swarms to conduct a range of different tasks, including navigation, reconnaissance, resupply and forward deployment of assets, with minimal oversight from human controllers. Using AI-enhanced navigation and target recognition software, both the THOR mini-UAS and PROBOT UGV can deploy, operate and return to base autonomously, thus reducing the workload of ‘manned’ elements and allowing them to shift their focus to other tasks. Elbit’s team also demonstrated how AI-enhanced UAS formations were capable of semi-autonomously deploying additional platforms or sensors in the field and consequently ‘growing’ their swarm organically.”

“The conceptually simplistic nature of this display belies the major implications this technology has for the future of the MUM-T operations concept, as the enhanced independence of autonomous or semi-autonomous platforms will gradually render the ‘man-in-the-loop’ obsolete, limiting the number of human operators required to conduct MUM-T and thus reducing logistical burdens, whilst also enhancing the formation’s survivability. Furthermore, by removing a degree of direct control over the individual UAS/UGV platforms, RAS and swarm technologies will provide the ‘manned’ elements with a greater degree of tactical and strategic control on the battlefield.”

“Indeed, by removing the need for a human to operate an unmanned platform’s navigation and target identification systems, the operator can then focus on more complex tasks such as relaying intelligence or coordinating manoeuvres with the other elements of a manned-unmanned unit formation. This is of particular importance within the land domain, as the application of MUM-T to military UGVs has been hampered by the fact current UGV platforms still require a significant level of human input when navigating complex terrain. As military organisations and defence contractors worldwide continue to invest in autonomous drone swarm technology, the ratio of manned to unmanned systems per MUM-T formation will likely decrease over time, as unmanned platforms become increasingly independent and reliable. Whether this trend will ever lead to the creation and deployment of entirely unmanned unit formations remains to be seen.”

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Madeline Wild, Associate Defense Analyst, comments: “Turkey’s ambitious aim to have launched a rocket that can reach the moon by 2023 reflects the overall nature of its space program. Rather than purely being necessitated by the desire for sovereign use and control of satellites, it revolves around the power and political superiority that headline grabbing achievements (such as reaching the moon) can bring. The introduction of Turkey’s space program in 2021 came shortly after Turkey’s longtime rival the UAE, announced that its space probe had entered Mars’ orbit. President Erdogan’s speech in February 2021, launched the Turkish space program and reinforced the geopolitical importance of the space program, much of which was rhetorically charged with ideas of domain leadership and the ‘space race’.

“Last year NATO made space the fifth domain to be covered by the collective security principles set out in the organizations charter. Subsequently it is unsurprising that members such as Turkey are boosting their space programs, in order to fulfil their commitments in the event of any potential incident in this domain. This will have been noted by TUA, the Turkish Space Agency, but it will not be the desire to uphold NATO’s collective security principle driving Turkish space development. Instead, Turkey’s fractious relationship with certain NATO members will fuel the desire to become a regional leader in the domain.”

Wild continues: “In the Strategic Plan 2019-2023, Turkey set out its aims to produce and procure 75% of all goods domestically by 2023. In order to do so whilst still meeting its space related targets, Turkey’s aerospace industry will have to rapidly upskill. Whilst Turkey will benefit from the fact that its domestic industry (namely state-owned company Rokestan) has already launched a sounding rocket, much of the current space activities are reliant on international cooperation. For example, US-based SpaceX is currently responsible for the launch of Turkish satellites, Türksat 5A being the most recent of these. Elon Musk and President Erdogan have had direct communication to discuss future cooperation and collaboration.”

“Turkey is also collaborating with Russia on space-based technology, a move which could heighten already tense relationships between NATO and the Black Sea state. Russia will help Turkey construct two launch platforms, one on land and one on sea. This forms part of a wider package of defense cooperation between the states, after the US denied the sale of the F-35 to Turkey, pushing President Erdogan further into the President Putin’s sphere of influence.”

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